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The Univalent Foundations of Mathematics (UF) provide not only
an entirely non-Cantorian conception of the basic objects of mathe-
matics (“homotopy types” instead of “sets”) but also a novel account
of how foundations ought to relate to mathematical practice. In this
paper, I intend to answer the question: In what way is UF a new foun-
dation of mathematics? I will begin by connecting UF to a pragmatist
reading of the structuralist thesis in the philosophy of mathematics,
which I will use to define a criterion that a formal system must satisfy
if it is to be regarded as a “structuralist foundation.” I will explain
why neither set-theoretic foundations like ZFC nor category-theoretic
foundations like ETCS are structuralist in my sense, essentially be-
cause of an undue emphasis on ontology at the expense of language.
Then I will argue that UF is better-able to live up to the proposed
criterion for a structuralist foundation than any currently available
foundational proposal. First, by showing that most criteria of iden-
tity in the practice of mathematics can be formalized in terms of the
preferred criterion of identity between the basic objects of UF (“ho-
motopy equivalence”). Second, by countering several objections that
have been raised against UF’s capacity to serve as a foundation for
the whole of mathematics.
∗Department of Philosophy, Princeton University. e-mail: dtsement@princeton.edu
I would like to thank (in random order) John Burgess, Paul Benacerraf, Hans Halvor-
son, Steve Awodey, Mike Shulman, Chris Kapulkin, Vladimir Voevodsky, Colin McLarty,
David Corfield, Richard Williamson, Urs Schreiber, Harry Crane, as well as audiences in
Philadelphia, London and Princeton. Lastly, I would like to single out in thanks an anony-
mous referee, who provided extremely detailed and illuminating comments that resulted
in many significant improvements.
1
1 Introduction
In one way or another, structuralism in mathematics is about getting rid of
inessential properties of mathematical objects. It doesn’t matter whether the
number 3 is written as III, iii or {{{∅}}}. What matters is that 3 comes
before 4 and after 2. It doesn’t matter whether 3 contains {{∅}} as an
element. What matters is that 3 is the immediate successor of the only even
prime. Thus, on some level, to be a structuralist about mathematical objects
is to believe that the only properties of those objects that matter are those we
may call structural properties. Everything else we can say of mathematical
objects is nonsense (or, more charitably, non-mathematical).
What could this possibly have to do with the foundations of mathematics?
Here is a wild thought: What if the non-structural properties of mathemat-
ical objects could be ruled out purely by grammatical considerations? In
other words, what if expressing mathematical nonsense like “{{∅}} ∈ 3”
became a grammatical impossibility rather than a philosophical curiosity?
A structuralist foundation for mathematics – as I will use the term – would
be a formal system that achieves this, i.e. one in which to express nonsense
becomes a grammatical impossibility. In this paper, I will argue that the Uni-
valent Foundations of mathematics provide a foundation that does justice to
this idea.
Other than perhaps the early Wittgenstein, the first person to envision
such a “nonsense-free” foundation was M. Makkai in his writings on First
Order Logic with Dependent Sorts (FOLDS) [25–27]. Needless to say, an
important precursor is the work of Lawvere [22] on the Elementary Theory
of the Category of Sets (ETCS) which forms a prototypical example of what
has come to be known as a “categorical” (or “category-theoretic”) foundation
of mathematics, as well as observations of Freyd [12] and Blanc [7] on how
dependently-typed languages can be used to avoid making non-structural dis-
tinctions.1 Despite claims made implicitly by Lawvere [22] and explicitly by
McLarty [32,33] (among others) to the effect that ETCS-style foundations are
compatible with a broadly structuralist view of mathematical objects, there
was no attempt to systematically restrict the language of these foundations
so that it is able to express only structural properties. In this endeavour,
Makkai was undoubtedly the pioneer.2
1ETCS is also called a “structural” set theory, as opposed to an “extensional” or “ma-
terial” one like ZFC. For accessible comparisons of the two see [23,35].
2Although I will not be dealing with Makkai’s system directly in this paper, let me
mention that in its most recent incarnation in [27] it goes under the name of Type-Theoretic
Categorical Foundations of Mathematics (TTCFM). See Marquis [29] for an exposition as
well as philosophical defence of Makkai’s views on the foundations of mathematics.
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Makkai’s vision for a “nonsense-free” foundation of mathematics inspired
V. Voevodsky to develop his own new foundational proposal going under the
name of Univalent Foundations (UF) [48–50,52]:3
Univalent Foundations can be seen as a realization of the vision of
Michael Makkai [which] was very important for me in my search
for a formal language for contemporary mathematics. ([51], p. 2)
In realizing this vision, UF has exploited a fascinating connection between
abstract homotopy theory and Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory (MLTT).4 The tech-
nical development underlying UF has come to be known as Homotopy Type
Theory (HoTT) [48]. Very roughly, HoTT consists of the idea that the basic
objects of MLTT (“types”) can be interpreted as homotopy types (“abstract
shapes”). The key feature of HoTT/UF – and what connects it both to struc-
turalism in the philosophy of mathematics and to “nonsense-free” foundations
in Makkai’s vein – is the so-called axiom of univalence which states, roughly,
that isomorphic objects are identical.5 Awodey [3] has already made a start
in highlighting the connections between UF, univalence and structuralism
and in this paper I will sharpen and further reinforce them. In particular, I
will argue that UF is better able to do justice to the ideal of a structural-
ist foundation than any other foundational proposal currently available, at
least for a particular way of making precise what this “structuralist ideal” is
supposed to be.
And although I will mainly examine UF from this rather localized dialec-
tical perspective, it is worth emphasizing that UF lies at the tip of a much
wider historical arc. The dominant narrative in the foundations of mathe-
matics goes as follows: the increasing complexity of mathematical analysis in
the 19th century made it imperative to reconstrue all mathematical proposi-
tions as logical (i.e. analytic) truths about simple entities – indeed, ideally,
as logic itself. And this demand – through Cantor, Frege, Russell, Dedekind,
Peano and others – eventually gave rise to set theory and first-order logic
as we now understand it together with an all-encompassing foundation of
3It is important to note, however, that Voevodsky’s and Makkai’s motivations for their
respective projects are very different. Makkai’s motivation was at least partly philosophi-
cal, aiming to develop a language that encodes a structuralist view of mathematical objects.
On the other hand, Voevodsky’s work on foundations had primarily a non-philosophical
motivation behind it: to develop usable “proof assistants” that mathematicians can use
to verify their theorems.
4This connection was discovered independently by Voevodsky [49] and by Awodey and
Warren [4, 53].
5A more correct way of paraphrasing the axiom of univalence is this: identity is iso-
morphic to isomorphism. A fully correct way of paraphrasing the axiom of univalence is
this: the (canonical) map that sends identities to isomorphisms is an isomorphism.
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mathematics in the form of Zermelo-Frankel set theory (ZF(C)). Following
these developments, Kantian views on the synthetic (and a priori) nature of
mathematics are more or less dismissed as the inevitable outgrowth of a much
too impoverished logic.6 A little-known aspect of this story is that at around
the same time as Cantor was laying out the groundwork for the developments
that would eventually lead us to ZFC, the idea of a synthetic geometry was
reborn through the work of figures such as Riemann, Grassmann, Mo¨bius,
Klein and Poincare.7 This new conception of geometry was dominated by
the idea of invariant form, namely of shapes and figures determined only up
to some shared (algebraically expressed) features, e.g. the number of holes
they contained. Klein’s famous Erlangen program – which aimed to classify
different geometries according to which symmetries the properties of its basic
figures were invariant under – emerged as perhaps the most mature expres-
sion of this new kind of synthetic/algebraic geometry. And category theory
– invented by S. Mac Lane and S. Eilenberg in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury – then offered a framework in which to develop a vast generalization of
Klein’s ideas, thus giving rise, eventually, to the monumental re-imagining
of algebraic geometry in the 20th century by Grothendieck and his school.8
UF was born right here: both Makkai’s and Voevodsky’s foundational vi-
sions emerged directly out of the category-theoretic approach to algebraic
geometry that was pioneered by Grothendieck and his school. In ways that
have yet to be made precise, UF represents a return to a more Kantian view
of mathematics, albeit one that also takes into account the revolutions in
formal reasoning of the post-Hilbert era. But I will say no more about this
6The clearest exposition of Kant’s views on the method of mathematics is to be found
in the beginning of the Doctrine of Method and especially in [A713/B742]. There Kant
explains that mathematics proceeds by constructing intuitions (e.g. specific triangles)
adequate to a priori concepts, not by analyzing such concepts (which is the task of phi-
losophy). (For a helpful overview see Carson [10].) Russell’s very influential criticism of
Kant was that a strong enough logic (e.g. first-order predicate logic) could compensate for
this element of “construction” without invoking some kind of pure intuition provided by
the human subject. This point of view came to be known as the “compensation thesis”.
For more discussion on Kant’s views on geometry see the Parsons-Hintikka debate [17,37]
as well as Friedman’s very influential recasting of the compensation thesis in [13, 14]. It
should also be made clear that the issue of whether or not Kant thought that demon-
strations themselves also involved pure intuition (rather than just the construction of the
concepts that they were to be applied to) remains a topic of controversy. For the latest
installment, see Hogan [19].
7Strictly speaking, one must draw a distinction between topology (the study of shapes)
and geometry (the study of distances) – in this very rough historical sketch I am including
both under the banner of “geometry”.
8Marquis [28] has made a compelling study of the connections between category theory,
Kleinian geometry and Grothendieck’s vision for algebraic geometry.
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here, leaving such explorations for future work.
Outline of the Paper
In Section 2 I will begin with a brief, non-technical introduction to Univalent
Foundations. In Section 3 I will offer a pragmatist reading of the structuralist
thesis in the philosophy of mathematics and then explain how it ought to
apply to the foundations of mathematics. I will then articulate a precise
criterion – (SFOM) – that a foundational system ought to satisfy if it is to
be called structuralist in my sense. I will then examine the extent to which
ZFC and ETCS fail (SFOM) (Section 3.1) and explain how (SFOM) shifts the
focus from ontology to language, thereby transcending the debate about the
foundational fitness of set theory vs. category theory (Section 3.2). In Section
4, I will argue that the axiom of univalence ensures that UF satisfies the
“principle of isomorphism” which entails, roughly, that isomorphic objects
are identical. I will spell out two further criteria that, if true, would ensure
that UF comes closest to (SFOM) than other proposals. In Section 5 I
argue that the second criterion is satisfied by describing a general method for
formalizing criteria of identity as homotopy equivalences. Finally, in Section
6, I will argue in favour of the first criterion by responding to several general
challenges that have been put forward against the foundational aspirations
of UF and by examining the scope of the general method of Section 5.
2 Univalent Foundations, HoTT and inten-
sional MLTT
A simple picture (sufficient for the purposes of this paper) of any founda-




...used to express a...−−−−−−−−−−→ Theory
(2)
...that describes a...−−−−−−−−−−→ Universe of Objects
(3)
where the “Basic Language” is a formal language of some sort, the “Theory”
is a formal theory establishing a standard of rigour (usually through a no-
tion of formal deduction) and the “Universe of Objects” is some intuitively
comprehensible collection of objects such that all of currently practiced math-
ematics can be encoded in terms of them. Clearly, this is intended to be a
very minimalist conception of a foundation of mathematics. One will usually
want to impose extra conditions, e.g. that the “Basic Language” is finite or
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that the “Theory” is consistent or that the “Universe of Objects” is philo-
sophically coherent in some appropriate sense. I will here refrain from doing
so explicitly – this adds generality to the theses that I will argue for, but also,
more importantly, indicates that the demand of (SFOM) that I will state in
Section 3 below does not depend on any notion of a foundation that goes
beyond this minimalist conception.
For set-theoretic foundations perhaps the most widely accepted set-up
in terms of the above picture is the following
First-Order Logic with equality
...used to express...−−−−−−−−−−→ ZFC ...that describes...−−−−−−−−−−→ V
where V is the “real” cumulative hierarchy of sets. Of course, within set-
theoretic foundations both (1) and (2) are subject to variation. For example,
(1) could be replaced by a Russellian type-theoretic syntax instead of first-
order logic (in which case (2) would, say, consist of asserting the axiom of
reducibility among other axioms). Or we could maintain first-order logic
as our (1) but use it to axiomatize different set theories in (2), e.g. ZF or
intuitionistic ZF.9 Furthermore, one could argue philosophically about the
metaphysics of (3), i.e. the “real nature” of V . What seemed inconceivable
until very recently was a foundational system (in the above sense) in which
component (3) was filled out by anything other than a universe of sets. To be
sure, there was disagreement about what that universe of sets really should
be. For example, should it understood as an ETCS-style category or a ZFC-
style cumulative hierarchy? But hardly anyone imagined the possibility of
a foundation of mathematics in which the universe of basic objects was not
meant to be understood as a collection/hierarchy/universe of sets of some
kind.
With the Univalent Foundations of mathematics (UF), this becomes a
real possibility. UF is a foundational proposal that differs from the standard
set-theoretic set-up in all of the above components (1),(2) and (3). The
standard set-up for UF – and the one I will consider for the purposes of this
paper – is as follows
Intensional MLTT
...used to express...−−−−−−−−−−→ HoTT ...that describes...−−−−−−−−−−→∞-Grpd
where∞-Grpd is the “real” universe of homotopy types. Thus, by the term
Univalent Foundations I will refer to a new foundation of mathematics
9I am assuming here that the deductive system that we impose on the basic formal
language comes in at stage (2) – but this is admittedly a difficult assumption to maintain
in the case of MLTT where the rules of well-formedness of expressions coincide with the
deductive rules. Still, even in dependent type theories used to formalize UF, there is a
useful distinction to be made between “basic” type-formers (e.g. Π, Σ or W -types) and
type-formers or axioms added specifically with the homotopy interpretation in mind.
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of which HoTT is just one of many possible formalizations and intensional
MLTT one of many possible basic languages.10 I will now briefly introduce
the above-stated components (1),(2) and (3) in the case of UF.11
“Intensional MLTT” refers to the cluster of formal systems that usually go
under the banner of intensional Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory (MLTT) [31].
MLTT was originally an attempt to give a constructivist12 and computer-
friendly foundation of mathematics. It comes in extensional and inten-
sional variants and we are here concerned exclusively with the latter. As a
formal system, the basic objects of MLTT are types and terms.13 A judg-
ment is a syntactic expression asserting a fact about terms and types in a
certain context. The rules of the system tell us how to construct new types
and terms from old ones using various type constructors, including but not
limited to the empty type (0), the singleton type (1), product types,
Π- and Σ-types etc. There are two main innovations in MLTT that set it
apart from the “type theories” that preceded it, e.g. Russell’s and Church’s.
Firstly, MLTT introduces the notion of a dependent type. The idea is
that we may “index” types by terms of another type - in which case we say
that the family of types being indexed depends on the indexing type. As a
formal judgement this would be written as Γ, x : A ` B(x) Type which is to
be read as follows: “In context Γ, given a term of type x : A we can produce a
type B(x).” Thus we say that the type B depends on A. Secondly, MLTT
introduces the notion of an identity type. As with other type constructors
the identity type is governed by four deductive rules: formation, intro-
duction, elimination and computation. The so-called formation rule,
for example, says that given any type A and any terms a, b of type A, it is
possible to form a type a =A b, to be thought of as the type of “proofs of
10That said, I will often use the terms UF and HoTT interchangeably, i.e. I will often
refer by the term UF to the particular formalization of UF as HoTT. This is in keeping
with standard set-theoretic practice of referring to ZFC as “set theory”.
11A full technical introduction to UF is neither possible nor necessary for the purposes
of this paper. What follows is something slightly more structured than a glossary, meant
to give some idea of what is meant by the term “Univalent Foundations” and to introduce
some terminology peculiar to the formal apparatus it employs. For more detailed technical
introductions see [3, 31,48,52].
12Martin-Lo¨f’s original name for his theory in [31] was Intuitionistic Type Theory - we
shall not be concerned here with terminological issues concerning the difference between
“constructivists” and “intuitionists”. Suffice it to say that although MLTT has most often
been associated with constructive/intuitionistic approaches to mathematics, UF is in no
way limited to constructive/intuitionistic logic. Indeed, HoTT is perfectly consistent with
an appropriately stated law of the excluded middle (cf. [48], Definition 3.4).
13One can think intuitively of types as sets and terms as elements of sets although in
homotopy type theory this way of thinking is misleading since one can prove that there
are types that are not h-sets (cf. [48], Example 3.1.9).
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identity” between a and b.
By “Homotopy Type Theory” (HoTT) I will mean the formal system laid
out in the Appendix of [48], namely intensional MLTT together with new
deductive rules governing univalent universes and higher inductive types.14 A
univalent universe is a universe of types (think: “class of sets”) U satisfying
the univalence axiom which states that the identity type between types
is equivalent to homotopy equivalence. In HoTT the types of MLTT
are no longer to be understood as sets, but rather as homotopy types or
∞-groupoids (for the purposes of this paper these two terms will be used
interchangeably). This claim has been made precise in [21], where a model
of HoTT is constructed in which types are interpreted as Kan complexes,
which provide a widely accepted model for ∞-groupoids constructed set-
theoretically.
And what are homotopy types? Surely we cannot rely on their defini-
tion as Kan complexes inside ZFC. Nor should we rely on the mathematical
definition of the homotopy group of a topological space, especially if that
topological space is understood as a set of points with a topology. In other
words: is there a “naive” way of understanding homotopy types? Broadly,
yes: homotopy types are to be thought of as abstract shapes, just as sets are
to be thought of as (abstract) collections.15 Why the qualifier “abstract”?
Because homotopy types are – as the term itself suggests – meant to encode
types of shapes that share some common structure. The homotopy type it-
self is the “skeleton” that is common to all particulars belonging to the given
type – hence an abstract shape. But this does not mean that these “skele-
tons” are not amenable to concrete representations. In fact, the theory of
∞-groupoids emerged partly as an attempt to represent them as concrete
combinatorial objects. What was scarcely imaginable was that these objects
could then be employed as the basic objects of a foundations of mathematics,
axiomatizable by a formal system in very much the same way as sets are.
But it is this very possibility that allows us to consider defining structuralist
foundations in the sense that I will now outline.
14It is important to note that this particular extension of MLTT is not the only homotopy
type theory that formalizes UF. A recent alternative proposal is Cubical Type Theory
[6, 11] designed with the specific intention of giving a constructive model of univalence.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, nothing hinges on the choice of formalization
and so we will identify the term HoTT with the formal system used in [48].
15For a more detailed exposition of a similar kind of view of homotopy types, as well as
an argument for their fundamentality, see Marquis [30].
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3 Structuralist Foundations of Mathematics
Following Benacerraf [5], philosophers advocating a structuralist position in
the philosophy of mathematics take themselves to be arguing in favour of
some reasonable variation of what we may call the structuralist thesis: Math-
ematical properties of mathematical objects are concerned with the relations
these objects bear to each other, rather than what these objects are. Parsons
[36], for example, expresses this as “the view that reference to mathematical
objects is always in the context of some background structure, and that the
objects involved have no more to them than can be expressed in terms of the
basic relations of the structure” and Resnik [40] as the view that “the objects
of mathematics [...] are structureless points or positions in structures [that]
have no identity or features outside of a structure.”
Rather ironically, several disputed structuralist positions are then carved
out through ontological disagreements on what “structure” itself is. There
is, for instance, disagreement over whether structures are possibilia (Hellman
[16] and, more obliquely, Putnam [38]) or Platonic natureless abstractions
(Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism in [43]) or even just sets (following in the
Bourbakian tradition). This direction takes the structuralist thesis to be
an observation about ontology: mathematical objects are structures. Put
differently: what it is for something to be a structural property is to be
determined by figuring out what structure means.
On the other hand we may take the structuralist thesis to be an observa-
tion about mathematical practice. Namely: the only mathematical properties
of a mathematical object that are meaningful in practice are those that are
invariant under “isomorphism”, where “isomorphism” is a place-holder for
the relevant criterion of identity for the type of object under consideration
and where what is “relevant” is to be understood by recourse to mathemat-
ical practice. For example, the only meaningful mathematical properties of
a group are those that are invariant under group isomorphism and the only
meaningful mathematical properties of dense linear orders are those that are
invariant under order-preserving bijections. Group isomorphism and order-
bijection are relevant criteria of identity because practicing group theorists
or number theorists (working, say, over Q) would agree that they preserve
the truth of the statements they are interested in. In short, we may de-
fine as structural those properties that mathematicians themselves would
find meaningful (or “sensible”). Let me call this the practical reading of the
structuralist thesis.
There are two ways to make good on the practical reading of the struc-
turalist thesis. Firstly, informally. This is roughly the direction taken by
Awodey [2] and McLarty [32,33] (“schematic” or “categorical” structuralism)
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and more recently by Burgess [8, 9] (“permanent parameter” structuralism).
Secondly, formally – this is where my interests lie. The focus here is more on
the foundations of mathematics rather than on the philosophy of mathemat-
ics. Specifically, we take the practical reading of the structuralist thesis to
indicate a “design constraint” for a foundation of mathematics. The motivat-
ing problem is thus to create a foundational system (in the sense of Section
2) such that any grammatically well-formed property about a mathematical
object is invariant under the appropriate criterion of identity for that object
(as those are formalized in the given system).
With this in mind I define a structuralist foundation of mathematics to
be a foundational system S that satisfies the following property:
(SFOM) Any theoretical context can be naturally formalized in S
in such a way that any grammatical property of an object in S is
invariant under the relevant criterion of identity in that context.
I will now clarify some of this terminology. A “foundational system” refers
to some formal system sufficiently expressive to encode all of (currently-
practiced) mathematics, i.e. component (2) of a foundation of mathematics
as outlined in Section 2. “Object” refers to a mathematical object (e.g.
a group, a number, a manifold) and a “grammatical property” refers to a
correctly formed expression in S (e.g. a well-formed formula φ in FOL=). By
“theoretical context” I mean a particular mathematical (sub-)discipline (e.g.
group theory or topology). By “criterion of identity” I mean the notions of
“sameness” employed by practitioners of those mathematical disciplines (e.g.
group isomorphism or homeomorphism of spaces).16 Finally, “invariance” of
a grammatical property P means that if P holds of x in S and if x ∼= y in S
then P also holds of y (where x, y and ∼= are the formalizations in S of two
objects in, and the criterion of identity of, a given theoretical context).
It is important to be clear that (SFOM) asserts the existence of invari-
ant formalizations, i.e. those that satisfy the invariance property outlined in
its statement. (SFOM) does not assert that all possible formalizations are
invariant. As the last sentence makes clear, (SFOM) is a principle relating
mathematical practice to the formalization of mathematical practice in S.
16It is an interesting question whether a choice of context determines the criterion of
identity or vice versa, but I will not get into this here. Furthermore, it is clearly an
oversimplification to say that mathematical disciplines are rigidly demarcated by a specific
type of structure they study up to a specific criterion of identity. For instance, how would
one demarcate number theory in those terms? Or algebraic geometry? Nevertheless,
nothing of substance hinges on the accuracy of my sociological analysis – its purpose is
merely to clarify the concepts of “theoretical context” and “criterion of identity” as they
will be used below.
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In order to make sense of (SFOM) these two concepts – practice vs. formal-
ization of practice – must be kept apart. For example, the “natural numbers”
as understood by the practicing number-theorist are not to be identified with
a model of Peano Arithmetic studied by the set theorist. Thus, the “invari-
ance” that (SFOM) demands is a statement about objects and criteria of
identity as formalized by S. The dominance of set theory in the last half-
century has often tempted philosophers to identify mathematical concepts
with their set-theoretic formalizations – it is of paramount importance that
we resist this temptation here.
Furthermore, we must note that the mere existence of invariant formal-
izations is too weak a demand to prove interesting. After all, almost any
foundational system can reasonably claim the mere existence of invariant
formalizations, since anything can be called a formalization, however con-
trived. For example, we could say that Peano Arithmetic provides invari-
ant formalizations for mathematical contexts simply by coding mathematical
statements as (lists of) numbers in a particular way. To avoid such cases,
(SFOM) imposes the additional constraint of requiring the existence of “nat-
ural” formalizations. This constraint demands that the required invariant
formalizations are:
1. Uniform: As much as possible, the invariant formalizations are ob-
tained through some general method of encoding that applies equally
well to all mathematical structures of interest
2. Native: The practicing mathematician would find the formalized no-
tions obtained through these invariant formalizations easily compre-
hensible
One may summarize the requirement of naturality as follows: (SFOM) de-
mands both the natural existence of invariant formalizations (uniformity)
and the existence of natural invariant formalizations (nativity).
Finally, let me note that as a criterion for foundational systems, (SFOM)
clearly depends on the current practice of mathematics. For it is mathemati-
cal practice that determines not only which notions have to be formalized but
also which formalizations are native and whether or not they are invariant.
As such, the ambition of (SFOM) cannot exceed our grasp of current math-
ematical practice. Mathematical practice evolves and so do the structures
that mathematicians find useful to work with. So the most reasonable way
to understand (SFOM) is as the demand that for most of the mathematical
structures of current interest there exists a uniform method for producing
native invariant formalizations. To speak of a foundation that can do this
for all mathematical structures of past, present and future interest is a goal
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worthy only of an incredulous stare – at least insofar as one remains grounded
in the practice of mathematics, as we intend to do.
Indeed, (SFOM) is put forward as an ideal to aspire to rather than a
realistic goal. In that sense, it is similar to the ideal of more traditional foun-
dations, summarized nicely in [34] as the attempt to find “consistent, finitely
axiomatizable theories [into which as many theories can be interpreted].” Full
assurance of consistency is never attainable by Go¨del’s theorems, but con-
siderations of simplicity, coherence etc. may provide better or worse reasons
to believe in it. Analogously, it is hard to imagine that (SFOM) will ever
be decisively satisfied, i.e. for any theoretical context. Rather, we will seek
foundational systems into which there are natural invariant formalizations of
ever more theoretical contexts. What I will establish in this paper is that UF
achieves just that, i.e. it comes closest to (SFOM) than all other foundational
proposals even if it remains shy of the ideal. Nevertheless, UF represents a
watershed moment since it appears that if one is to make any progress with
respect to (SFOM) one has to move beyond a broadly Cantorian picture of
the foundations of mathematics. To see this, we will now examine the extent
to which current set-theoretic foundations fail (SFOM).
3.1 ZFC and ETCS are not structuralist foundations
It is relatively straightforward to see how ZFC fails (SFOM).17 Let our “the-
oretical context” be traditional group theory, i.e. the study of groups up to
isomorphism exemplified by the kind of methods and questions that, say, go
into the monumental proof of the classification of finite simple groups. In this
theoretical context the “objects” of study are groups and the “criterion of
identity” is group isomorphism. In ZFC, a group is formalized by first-order
formulas defining what it is for a set to have group structure. More precisely,
we define a three-place predicate
Group(x, ∗, 0) ≡ ∗ ∈ (x× x→ x) ∧ 0 ∈ x ∧GroupAxioms(∗, 0)
with the obvious abbreviations. What it is to be a group in ZFC is to
satisfy this predicate. Similarly, what it is for two groups to be isomorphic
is formalized by a predicate
Iso(x, y) ≡ Group(x) ∧Group(y) ∧ ∃f ∈ (x→ y)(homom(f) ∧ bijective(f))
17Everything I say applies to any standard set-theoretic foundation. I pick ZFC for this
example merely for its “brand recognition”.
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again with the obvious abbreviations and suppressing explicit mention of the
group operations.18 What it is for two sets x, y to be isomorphic as groups
in ZFC is to satisfy Iso(x, y). Furthermore, by a “grammatical property of
an object” in ZFC we mean simply a one-place open formula φ(x) in the
language of ZFC and for such a grammatical property φ(x) to be “invariant
under the relevant criterion of identity” we mean that
ZFC |= (Iso(x, y) ∧ φ(x))→ φ(y)
So with all this in mind now take
φ(x) ≡ 1 ∈ x
to be such a “grammatical property” and consider Z and 2Z with their canon-
ical (additive) group structure.19 We have
ZFC |= Iso(Z, 2Z)




In ZFC therefore we have that φ(Z) is true whereas φ(2Z) is not true even
though Z ∼= 2Z, i.e. even though Z and 2Z are identical with respect to the
relevant group-theoretic criterion of identity. In short, grammatical prop-
erties in ZFC are not invariant with respect to group isomorphism as it is
formalized in ZFC. Therefore, ZFC fails (SFOM).20
The above analysis carries over almost verbatim to so-called “structural
set theories” [23,33] of which Lawvere’s ETCS [22] is perhaps the paradigm.
To see this, let o stand for the canonical arrow
o : 1→ Z
18I am being a bit quick here, for the sake of exposition. Strictly speaking, the actual
operation and identity elements of groups x,y would have to be used in defining what it
is for a function f to be a homomorphism.
19By “1” here I mean the set corresponding to the successor of zero in some choice of
a model of arithemtic inside ZFC, e.g. the singleton set {∅}. By Z and 2Z I mean the
formalizations of the additive groups of integers and even integers respectively.
20Of course, one could argue that there are non-standard ways of formalizing groups
and group isomorphisms in ZFC such that the required invariance holds. However, it is




φ(x) ≡ cod(o) = x
where cod is the codomain operation of arity Arrows→ Objects that takes




Thus, just like ZFC, ETCS also fails (SFOM).
That it does so illustrates an important omission on the part of those
who have advocated ETCS (and its variants) as “structural” set theories.
A commonly-employed argument in making such a claim is that in ETCS
the natural numbers N are only defined up to isomorphism. More precisely,
in ETCS one defines the natural numbers by defining a natural numbers
object (NNO) via a universal property. Thus, one of the axioms of ETCS
asserts that such an NNO satisfying the requisite universal property exists.
It is indeed the case that this axiom determines an NNO only up to isomor-
phism – but then again so does the axiom of infinity in ZFC “determine”
ℵ0 up to bijection. And just as the axiom of infinity in ZFC does not pre-
vent us from expressing properties that are true of one countably infinite
set but not of another, so does the axiom for the NNO not prevent us from
expressing properties that are true of one NNO but not of another (neces-
sarily) isomorphic to it. Similarly, the axiom of an NNO no more prevents
us from stating properties that separate Z from 2Z than the axiom of infin-
ity prevents us from stating properties separating {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, ...} from
{∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, ...}. This indicates that the real culprit is not the notion
of elementhood of extensional set theories like ZFC but rather the availability
of a global (untyped) identity predicate. In the case of ZFC this identity is
intended to apply to individual sets and in the case of ETCS it is intended
to apply to individual functions between sets, but this makes little difference
with respect to (SFOM).
One might object that this criticism of ZFC and ETCS relies essentially
on their being formulated in first-order logic. This is correct: the criticism I
have presented so far applies to languages with a global (untyped) identity
predicate and not just to certain theories that can be formulated in terms
of such languages. There are alternative ways of formulating some of these
theories that make no essential use of first-order logic. For example, ETCS
21I am glossing over the details of the exact presentation of ETCS as a many-sorted
first-order theory. For a clear and concise presentation see Palmgren [35].
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can be formulated on top of a simple dependent type theory or, alternatively,
as a theory in Makkai’s First-Order Logic with Dependent Sort (FOLDS).
Yet although such formulations do avoid the kind of objection outlined
above for set-level structures (such as Z) they still do not avoid it for higher-
level structures like categories. The reason, essentially, is once again that
such formulations contain something that behaves very much like an untyped
identity predicate. To illustrate, consider the axiomatization of ETCS as the
FOLDS Labset-theory Tabset of abstract sets in [27]. One can show that any
Labset-sentence is invariant under isomorphism of diagrams in any model
E of Tabset. Thus, any set-level structure that can be expressed in terms
of an internal diagram in E will satisfy the required invariance property.
Formalizing such set-level structures in terms of diagrams in E thus gives us
a (SFOM)-compatible general method for formalizing all set-level structures.
However, this invariance does not extend beyond isomorphism of diagrams,
and therefore becomes problematic when we want to axiomatize higher-level
structures like categories.
To see this, recall that a category internal to another category with ap-
propriate structure is given by a diagram







satisfying certain conditions (where d is for “domain”, c is for “codomain”,
i is for “identity” and m is the composition operation). As explained above,
FOLDS Labset-sentences will be invariant only under isomorphism of such
diagrams. This means that the desired invariance will hold only if the sets of
objects of two such internal categories are isomorphic. Thus, Labset-formulas
will be invariant only up to isomorphism, rather than equivalence, of cate-
gories and it is the latter that is usually the criterion of identity one wants to
consider in this theoretical context.22 So in particular in Tabset it is possible
to define the category 1 consisting of one object and one identity morphism
and the category 1i with two objects and an isomorphism between them, and
then to state an Labset-sentence that is true of one but not true of the other.
The same reasoning can be repeated for similar such “type-theoretic” ax-
iomatizations of ETCS, thus casting a doubt on their adherence to (SFOM)
beyond set-level structures.
One point that may be granted, however, is that structural set theories
like ETCS certainly do better than ZFC in this respect since it is not even
possible to formulate the latter in this “half-way” manner. For even if ZFC is
22As we shall see in Section 5, the situation is slightly more subtle.
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formulated on top of a type theory, the culpable distinctions can still be made
from the very beginning because we will have available to us the membership
relation “∈”. Nevertheless, neither approach, whether fully first-order or
“half-way”, manages to avoid making irrelevant distinctions at some point.
If we are to make any progress, it appears that we need to entirely reconsider
the basic language on which these foundations are based, rather than this or
that axiom we can express using it.
3.2 From Ontology to Language
Clearly, then, (SFOM) is not at all intended to separate set-theoretic foun-
dations from category-theoretic foundations of mathematics. As such, the
demand for (SFOM) transcends the debate between category-theoretic and
set-theoretic foundations of mathematics. But have we gone too far then?
By lumping category-theoretic and set-theoretic foundations together, what
kind of circle have I drawn around them? Is there anything left on the other
side?
In a way, (SFOM) urges a “linguistic turn” in the foundations of mathe-
matics. Forget about the metaphysical view that a certain foundation takes
of its basic objects. Instead, focus on what properties of those objects its
language allows it to express. To be sure, there is a significant metaphysical
difference in how a material set theory and a structural set theory view the
objects they are trying to axiomatize. But it is their linguistic promiscuity
that (SFOM) rejects, not their intended metaphysics. Structuralism in the
sense of (SFOM) is thus best thought of as a constraint on language: we
want to stop ourselves from being able to express non-structural properties
of objects.
One may now wonder: if this constraint on language is all that is re-
quired, then why not just replace objects with isomorphism classes? Both
set-theoretic and category-theoretic foundations allow us to do this and doing
so certainly would satisfy the criterion that (SFOM) demands of us: for if we
formally identify two things, then surely we won’t be able to say something
of one that is not true of the other since there will not even be an “other” of
which to say anything at all.
The problem is that treating isomorphic objects as actually identical in-
volves essential loss of information. To see this, we must first note that there
are two ways of treating isomorphic objects as identical. Firstly, by sim-
ply lumping them together in isomorphism classes and ignoring non-identity
isomorphisms between them. For example, if I were to replace Z with its
isomorphism class as a group, I am no longer able to ask how many homo-
morphisms there are, say, between Z and 2Z – indeed I cannot really talk
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about Hom(Z, 2Z) at all. However, that Z and 2Z are isomorphic as groups is
a non-trivial mathematical fact – not being able to express it at all is clearly
a crippling limitation.
Secondly, and less naively, we can treat isomorphic objects as identical
by identifying isomorphic objects without forgetting about non-identity iso-
morphisms between them. This is essentially what happens when one moves
from a category C to a skeleton sk(C): isomorphisms between objects a, b
in C become (non-identity) automorphisms in sk(C). Thus, although we
have “fewer” objects than we started with we have just as many arrows and
this ensures that no essential information has been lost. Unfortunately, the
problem reappears when we then want to talk about further structure on
sk(C). For example, even if we move from the category of sets Set to one
of its skeletons S (thus identifying bijective sets) this does not ensure that
isomorphic groups defined on S are now also equal. To achieve this, we
would have to then consider a skeleton of the category Grp(S), and so on.23
This brings into sharp relief the following crucial distinction: identifying iso-
morphic objects is not at all the same thing as making isomorphic objects
indistinguishable. The former involves loss of information, whereas the latter
does not. Doing the former is possible even in ZFC or ETCS but doing the
latter is not.
In other words, (SFOM) does not express an appeal to identify isomorphic
objects. Quite the contrary: it is of paramount importance, mathematically,
to be able to state an isomorphism between two mathematical objects, e.g.
between Z and 2Z. And in order to even be able to state such an isomorphism,
clearly we do need to view Z and 2Z as distinct on some level. The reader has
perhaps already felt some unease about this point. We are speaking of making
isomorphic objects indistinguishable, but if an isomorphism between them is
to be construed as a substantive statement, then surely we must distinguish
them somehow. And if we can distinguish them somehow, even if they are
isomorphic, then what kind of structuralists are we? Even worse, if we buy
into Quine’s [39] slogan that there should be no entity without identity, then
to accept that our isomorphism relates entities is to pre-suppose that there
is some notion of identity (other than isomorphism) that allows us to view
them as distinct to begin with. We appear to have fallen into a trap.
At this point I want to say that we have been trapped only by an ex-
cessive pre-occupation with ontology. After all, what (SFOM) demands is
quite simple: as long as we can establish an isomorphism between two ob-
jects, then there is no grammatical property of one that does not also hold
of the other. This says nothing about what these objects are. That is not
23I am indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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to say that we don’t know what these objects are: they are formalized ver-
sions of constructions employed by mathematicians. “And what are these
constructions that mathematicians employ?” Enough. It is irrelevant to our
purposes. All we require is that whatever these constructions are (Platonic
abstractions, mental occurences, intersubjectively valid concepts etc.) the
people that use them – the mathematicians – agree that they have been ade-
quately formalized in the given foundational system we are studying.24 Is it
possible to speak of such objects without commiting ourselves to a notion of
identity that is finer than any isomorphism that we could establish between
them a posteriori? I think it is, at least in the following uncontroversial
sense: whatever notion of identity we require in order to distinguish between
two presentations of isomorphic objects, it is not necessarily a notion of iden-
tity relevant in the mathematical practice from which the particular notion
of isomorphism emerges. For example, we have a way of presenting Z as a
group and we also have a way of presenting 2Z as a group. But when we are
doing group theory these distinct ways of presenting these isomorphic groups
should not automatically commit us to regarding propositions like “Z 6= 2Z”
as relevant to group theory.25
Therefore, in order to avoid the Quinean trap, we should make this most
minimal of pre-suppositions: that there are distinct ways of presenting ob-
jects without committing ourselves to the existence of a significant proposi-
tion that distinguishes them. This presupposition allows us to say: if we can
establish an isomorphism between these two distinct ways of presenting this
object, then we should not be able to state anything in our language that is
true of one presentation but not true of the other. And this is exactly what
(SFOM) demands. Even the word “object” in the previous sentence is some-
thing of a distraction. We can drop talk of objects altogether. Forget about
referents/extensions. All we have are senses/intensions – and what (SFOM)
wants is that if two such senses/intensions can be shown to be “isomorphic”
then the required invariance property holds. In shifting our focus from on-
tology to language, we can thus completely invert the Quinean motto: there
24This attitude towards mathematical objects is inspired by Burgess’ permament param-
eter structuralism as elaborated in [9]. What I am saying, roughly, is that mathematical
objects should be understood as parameters, about whose nature we do not care as long as
they behave the way we expect them to. And this allows us to speak of “alternative pre-
sentations” of such objects without committing ourselves to a criterion of identity between
them.
25Of course, in the context of number theory a proposition like “Z 6= 2Z” is highly
relevant indeed since we care very much to distinguish odd from even integers, e.g. when
we state Goldbach’s conjecture. But in the context of number theory group isomorphism
is not, in general, the relevant criterion of identity.
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is no identity without entities.26 In other words, if we think of “identity”
between two objects A and B as no more than what allows us to transfer
any properties of A to B and vice versa, then what (SFOM) demands is that
“identity” become identified with “isomorphism”. Or, more accurately: that
“identity” become isomorphic with “isomorphism”. As I will now go on to
argue, this is exactly what the axiom of univalence in UF achieves.
4 Univalence and (SFOM)
What does the axiom of univalence say? It says, quite literally, that to ask
of two types whether or not they are identical is the same as asking whether
or not they are “isomorphic.” In symbols this can be expressed as follows.
For any types A and B (understood as terms in a universe of types U) the
following holds:
(A =U B) ∼= (A ∼= B)
where “∼=” is a symbol for (the syntactic definition of a general notion of) iso-
morphism and “=U” is the symbol for the identity type in MLTT formed in U
(when A and B are regarded as its terms). Thus, when properly paraphrased,
the axiom of univalence (UA) asserts the following: Identity is isomorphic to
isomorphism.27
The statement of univalence might immediately appear baﬄing. For it
seems as though UA is asserting an isomorphism between two things, one of
which is not at all clearly a structure. For suppose one accepts that the type
“A ∼= B” of isomorphisms is a structure of some sort. Then what about the
identity A =U B? Identity, surely, is a proposition of some sort. It is either
true or false. How can a proposition be isomorphic to a structure? It appears
that the statement of univalence involves a category mistake.
Strange as it may initially appear, the answer is that in UF (and in
intensional MLTT more generally) identity is not (generally) a proposition
– it just is a structure. Depending on A and B, A =U B could turn out
to be a structure containing a lot more information than merely whether it
is inhabited (“true”) or not (“false”). For example, there could be distinct
terms of type A =U B, which one can think of as distinct proofs of the
identity between A and B. In short, for the statement of UA to make sense
26More accurately, but less sonorously: there is no criterion of identity without names
for entities.
27As has already been noted, the precise statement of univalence asserts that identity is
isomorphic to isomorphism by asserting that a canonical map from identities to isomor-
phisms is an isomorphism. In other words, univalence asserts that a particular (canonical)
map is an isomorphism, and not merely the existence of an isomorphism.
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one must accept the point of view of identity-as-structure. And after doing
so, it is not too much of a stretch to view UA as analogous to the axiom
of extensionality in set theory. Just as the latter provides a definition of
(the previously underdetermined) equality of sets (“Two sets are equal if and
only if they have the same elements”) so does UA provide a definition of the
(previously underdetermined) identity of types in intensional MLTT. The
key difference, however, is that the “definition” that UA provides does not
assert the logical equivalence of one fact (“being equal sets”) to another fact
(“having the same elements”). Instead, it asserts the isomorphism of one
structure (“identity type”) to another structure (“type of isomorphisms”).
So now let us ask: what can univalence do for us when it comes to
(SFOM)? Firstly, UA ensures that any grammatical property P expressible
in HoTT that is true of a type A is also true of a type B that is isomorphic to
A. Following Awodey [3], we may call this fact the Principle of Isomorphism
(PI).28 As shown by Awodey [3] in quite some detail, UF satisfies (PI). How?
Roughly, because a proof of isomorphism between A and B can give rise,
through UA, to a proof of identity between A and B. And since properties
are invariant under identity we get that if P holds of A then it also holds
of B. Thus, any grammatically well-formed property in HoTT is invariant
under isomorphism.
Furthermore, we must now note that the term “isomorphism” in the state-
ment of (PI) and in how we have been using it above actually refers to a much
more general notion. This more general notion is homotopy equivalence which
can be understood as the “correct” criterion of identity for homotopy types.
The notion of homotopy equivalence originates in algebraic topology but it
can be expressed syntactically in intensional MLTT without the addition of
extra non-logical symbols. That this can be done is one of the key insights
that led to the homotopy interpretation of MLTT. Thus, given any two types
A,B in U it is possible to define a type of homotopy equivalences between
A and B using only the symbols of MLTT. One can certainly continue to
think of it as the type of “isomorphisms” between A and B as long as it is
clear that it is a more general notion than what is usually understood by the
term “isomorphism”, i.e. structure-preserving bijections between sets. But
– as Awodey himself notes – homotopy equivalence does specialize to more
familiar notions in more familiar cases. For example, bijections between sets
can be seen as special instances of homotopy equivalence and so can logical
equivalence of propositions.29
28In [3], Awodey refers to (PI) as the Principle of Invariance but this is merely a termi-
nological difference.
29In keeping with the notation above, I will continue to use A ∼= B to denote the type of
homotopy equivalences, except when ambiguity might arise, as in Section 5, where I will
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An important issue here is that homotopy equivalence, as defined in
HoTT, only meaningfully applies to pairs of types A,B in a (univalent)
universe U and not to terms of such types. Therefore, it makes prima facie
no sense to speak of homotopy equivalence between two terms a, b of a type
A in U . We shall however stipulate here that we will regard such instances
as degenerate cases of the notion of homotopy equivalence. In other words,
we will allow ourselves to refer to the identity type a =A b for terms a, b : A
as the type of homotopy equivalences between them; from now on the term
“homotopy equivalence” will be understood in this expanded sense and we
will use the notation a ∼= b to denote it. One can of course take this as
no more than a terminological convention. But since the way in which I
will argue for (CI) below depends on it I ought to say a few words about
why it is a reasonable point of view to adopt. The reason, quite simply, is
that types themselves can be regarded as terms of a (univalent) universe U
and in that case homotopy equivalence does apply to terms of a type. From
a topological point of view, anything can be regarded as a point or as a
space; viewing spaces as points in some larger space allows us to talk about
homotopy equivalence between points.30
With this in mind, one cannot fail to notice the similarity between (PI)
and (SFOM) when the latter is specialized to UF. For what we have is
(PI) Any grammatical property of an object in HoTT is invariant
under homotopy equivalence
and what we need is
(SFOM-UF) Any theoretical context can be naturally for-
malized in HoTT in such a way that any grammatical prop-
erty of an object in HoTT is invariant under the relevant cri-
terion of identity in that context
In order to argue that UF is a structuralist foundation in my sense it suffices
to show that (PI)⇒(SFOM-UF) and as the above comparison makes clear,
to do so one needs to argue that
(F) any theoretical context can be naturally formalized in HoTT
and
use the more standard “'”.
30This can even be formalized in point-set topology for sufficiently nice spaces, by regard-
ing their points as singleton subspaces and showing that equal such points are (trivially)
homotopy-equivalent as singleton subspaces.
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(CI) in such a way that the relevant criterion of identity for that
context coincides with homotopy equivalence.
I will investigate the extent to which (F) is true in Section 6. The following
Section is devoted to showing that (CI) is true.
5 Criteria of Identity as Homotopy Equiva-
lence
In order to establish (CI) we must provide a general method for formalizing
mathematical structures such that their formalized criterion of identity coin-
cides with homotopy equivalence. In what sense of “coincide”? At the very
least, in the sense of “being homotopy equivalent to” it.
The set-up is as follows: we are given informally a class Oinf of objects
and a specification of a criterion of identity ∼inf for these objects.31 A
formalization of the theoretical context given by Oinf and ∼inf then consists
of a type OUF in U together with a relation ∼UF between any two terms of
that type. Formally, we can write this relation as
∼UF : OUF → OUF → U
and it is important to note that this relation is not necessarily a proposition.
Namely, for any a, b : OUF the most we can tell about a ∼UF b is that it is a
type in U .32
What remains now is to show that ∼UF coincides with homotopy equiv-
alence. Clearly there are many ways to make this precise, as we have not
restricted ourselves to a single way of understanding what it means for ∼UF to
“coincide with homotopy equivalence.” I will make it precise in the following
way:
31What this “class” is and how exactly it is “specified” we leave open. At the very least,
there should be some consensus among practicing mathematicians that studying objects
of type Oinf under ∼inf constitutes a legitimate specialization. For instance, studying
groups under group isomorphisms (“group theory”) or studying topological spaces up to
homotopy equivalence (“homotopy theory”).
32Just like what was said about identity types in the beginning of Section 4, a criterion
of identity is also to be understood as a structure rather than a proposition. Of course, if
∼UF is to be meaningfully regarded as a criterion of identity then we will usually assume
that it is at least reflexive, symmetric and transitive (in the type-theoretic sense). But
we also allow for criteria of identity that satisfy much stronger properties, e.g. identity
systems in the sense of [48], Definition 5.8.3.
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i. Define ∼UF as a type ∼=O canonically definable from OUF and canoni-
cally equivalent to the type of homotopy equivalences on OUF.33
ii. Provide a general method that exhibits ∼=O as the correct formalization
of ∼inf under a certain way of understanding Oinf and ∼inf.
The first task is taken up in Section 5.1 and the second task in Section 5.2.
5.1 Component-wise isomorphism as a criterion of iden-
tity
To define ∼=O we must consider two cases. Firstly, that in which Oinf is
formalized as a type that does not involve collecting other types together.
For example, if Oinf is the class of natural numbers N and∼inf is the relation of
equality of numbers – in which case the “theoretical context” is, say, number
theory. Secondly, that in which Oinf is formalized as a collection of types
with certain additional structure, satisfying certain properties. For example,
if Oinf is the class of groups and ∼inf is the relation of group isomorphism – in
which case the “theoretical context” is, say, group theory. In model-theoretic
terms we can think of types of the first kind as theories with an intended
model (e.g. arithmetic) and types of the second kind as theories without an
intended model (e.g. group theory).
In the first case, OUF will be some type constructed in UF without using
a Σ-constructor over U . In other words, given terms a, b : OUF their identity
type a =OUF b is not equivalent to some type that itself contains an identity
type between two types in U . To illustrate: if OUF ≡ N then the identity
type between any two terms n,m : N is simply the identity type formed in
the usual way. It is not equivalent to some other type that is constructed
out of other identity types. Thus, as long as we are formalizing a theoretical
context of the first kind, the relevant criterion of identity will be given by
the identity type for terms of that type, just as in intensional MLTT. Since
we have stipulated that in such cases we will consider the identity type as
a degenerate version of homotopy equivalence, we get a formalization of the
kind demanded by (CI).
In the second case, we are studying a class of structures best formalized




33Where “homotopy equivalences” are understood in the expanded sense outlined in
Section 4.
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i.e. a collection of types A in a universe U that have a certain structure
Struc(A) satisfying certain properties Prop(A).34 How can we describe the
identity type for two terms M,N of type S? Roughly, as follows: the identity
type of two terms of a Σ-type is given by the Σ-type of identities between
those two terms. In more detail, given two terms




(〈a, p〉 = 〈b, q〉) ∼= Σ
pi : a=Ab
(pi∗(p) =B(p) q)
In other words, identities between terms 〈a, p〉 and 〈b, q〉 are equivalent to
identities between each of their components. But in order for this statement
to make sense grammatically (i.e. be “well-typed”) we need to transfer the
information appropriately along the previously given identities, which is what
the symbol pi∗ indicates. Univalence then licenses us to replace “=” with “'”
in the formula above. Therefore, the identity type of OUF will coincide with
the type of homotopy equivalences between each component. For any given
OUF we will denote this type of “component-wise isomorphisms” by ∼=O.
As an illustration of how ∼=O is defined, consider the case of graphs. Pre-
formally, a graph G = 〈V,E〉 is a collection of vertices V together with, for
any two nodes, a collection of (possibly multiple) edges E between any two
vertices v1 and v2. We consider two such graphs G1, G2 equivalent if there is
an isomorphism between V1 and V2 that preserves the number of edges. In
UF, we can formalize graphs as the following type
Ograph ≡ Σ
V : U
V → V → SetU
Now, take two terms of this type, 〈V1, E1〉 and 〈V2, E2〉. We have:
(〈V1, E1〉 = 〈V2, E2〉) ∼= Σ
p : V1=V2
p∗(E1) = E2
As explained above, we now define ∼=Ograph by replacing the identity signs on
the right-hand side above by the types of of homotopy equivalences, denoted
here by “'”. So in the example this gives us
(〈V1, E1〉 ∼=Ograph 〈V2, E2〉) ≡df Σp : V1'V2p∗(E1) ' E2
As is hopefully clear, ∼=Ograph is defined canonically from Ograph, namely by
the two-step process of writing out the identity type and then replacing “=”
34S is of course itself a type, possibly in a higher universe of types.
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with “'”.35
It might now appear that the relevant question to ask is whether ∼=O
captures the meaning of our original informal notion ∼inf, whatever that
may be. In one sense, this question is impossible to settle. There will always
be room for a persistent skeptic to doubt that this has been achieved: “Has
the meaning of group isomorphism as mathematicians understand it really
been captured by the appropriate instance of homotopy equivalence in UF?”
But as Quine long ago made vivid, this kind of skepticism is an artefact of
the very process of translating (or, in our case, the process of formalizing)
rather than of the particular language we are translating into (in our case,
HoTT). And in another sense, the question has a trivial answer. After all, the
identity types in UF only “see” those features of the terms being considered
that were used to define these terms to begin with. And if we agree that the
terms of OUF adequately capture the features of objects of the class Oinf that
we are interested in (e.g. that they are sets, that they have a multiplicative
operation etc.) then the identity type will “see” all those features and thus
preserve them. And therefore, by univalence, so will ∼=O.
Therefore, the issue is not really about comparing the meaning of ∼=O and
∼inf. The right question to ask, rather, is the following: Is∼=O always deduced
from ∼inf in a canonical way? In cases of set-level structures (e.g. groups,
rings) formalized as h-sets-with-structure the “Structure Identity Principle”
(cf. [48], Chapter 9.8 and especially Definition 9.8.4) already provides a
standard way of deriving their criteria of identity from their definition, in
much the same way that elementary equivalence of models in first-order logic
can be derived from the signature of the corresponding first-order theory.
And in those cases, the given criterion of identity does in fact coincide with
∼=O. But is there such a general method even for more complicated – and
not necessarily “set-level” – structures? This is the task I now take up.
35Occasionally (e.g. in the case of (pre)categories, see below) we might be interested in
more explicit descriptions of the right hand side. For example, in the case of graphs, using
function extensionality and the fact that the Ei are set-valued functions, we can obtain




E1(x, y) ' E2(p∗(x), p∗(y)))
which more closely resembles what we have come to expect graph-isomorphism to mean
in practice, namely an isomorphism of the vertex-set that induces isomorphisms on the
corresponding edge-sets. Nevertheless, even if the process of “rewriting conveniently” is
not canonical, the process of obtaining ∼=O is, in fact, canonical.
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5.2 The general method for (CI)
To illustrate the task at hand, as well as sketch my proposed method, let us
consider the case of category theory. First, let me quickly review how cate-
gory theory is formalized in UF. A widely accepted definition of a category
in UF is the following:
Definition 5.1 ([1, 48]). A univalent category C consists of the following
data:
1. A type C : U (“objects”)
2. A dependent type HomC : C → C → SetU (“Hom-sets”)
3. A term 1: Π
a : C
HomC(a, a) (“identity”)
4. A term ◦ : Π
a,b,c : C









h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f






(f ◦ 1a = f)× (1b ◦ f = f)
which witnesses right and left cancellability of identity maps.
7. The canonical map idtoisoa,b : a = b→ a ∼= b is an equivalence for all




The data in (1)-(6) express in type-theoretic notation exactly the standard
defining structure and properties of a category, i.e. that it consists of a
collection of objects (1), a collection of arrows (2), an identity arrow on each
object (3) and a composition operation (4) that is associative (5) and for
which the identity arrows are left and right inverses (6). Condition (7), on
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the other hand, is new in UF.36 It expresses, as we shall see, the requirement
that isomorphism between objects inside a category be equivalent to identity
between those objects. We will refer to it as the saturation condition.
On the other hand, there is another, more “na¨ıve”, notion that could
serve as a formalization of category theory in UF:
Definition 5.2. A precategory C consists of data (1)-(6) in Definition 5.1.
Precategories and (univalent) categories are not equivalent structures or
theories.37 So it appears that there are two distinct plausible formalizations of
category theory in UF. Each of them comes with its own criterion of identity
and prima facie each of these criteria of identity are plausible formalizations
for categorical equivalence as it is understood in mathematical practice. So
we now appear to be in a bind: if there are two inequivalent, but equally
plausible, formalizations of category theory in UF then how could ∼=O be
deduced in a canonical way from OUF, given that we cannot even pick the
correct “OUF”?
What I want to say now is that we are in a bind only insofar as we assume
that both univalent categories and precategories are distinct formalizations of
the same informal mathematical notion. It is this dubious assumption which
we must now lay to rest. Precategories and univalent categories, I submit,
are best understood as (distinct) formalizations of distinct notions. Strange
as this may seem from a set-theoretic point of view, it is in fact consistent
with one of the fundamental tenets of UF, namely that (higher) categories
are structures on (higher) groupoids rather than groupoids being categories
with an extra property (all arrows are invertible). From this point of view,
it is entirely natural that there should be “two (or possibly more) category
theories” since a category is no longer a fundamental thing that we can only
define in one way, but rather one of many possible structures that we can
impose on (higher) groupoids. By analogy, consider the many kinds of order-
ings we have on bare sets: partial orderings, total orderings, well-orderings
etc. Each of these can be studied in set theory as a separate notion. They
36Although a similar kind of condition was considered already by Hofmann and Streicher
in their groupoid model for MLTT, cf. [18].
37But there is also a strong relation between them: roughly, every precategory gives rise
to a univalent category (called its Rezk completion in [48]) that is “weakly equivalent” to
it. For the categorically-minded reader: the obvious forgetful “functor” from univalent
categories to precategories has a “left adjoint”. Perhaps someone may wish to claim that
this relation between the two notions shows that there is a kind of equivalence between
them. This would challenge the points I go on to make below. But this is the wrong
conclusion to draw. Similar relations (“forgetful-free adjunctions”) are borne by classes of
structures that on no reasonable account of “equivalence” should we wish to call equivalent.
For example, groups and (bare) sets bear this relation.
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formalize different kinds of orderings that we may consider in mathematical
practice. Would we want to criticize set theory for being unable to capture
the “theory of orders”? No, because in set-theoretic foundations sets are fun-
damental and ordered sets are non-fundamental structures we define on sets.
Similarly, in univalent foundations, homotopy types are fundamental and
categories are non-fundamental structures we define on homotopy types.38
What is now left to show is that ∼=Ocatiso and ∼=Ocatequiv are derived from
∼catiso and ∼catequiv in a canonical way (that applies equally well to both).
To see this, we must somehow describe categories-up-to-equivalence and
categories-up-to-isomorphism as made up of components in such a way that
both ∼catiso and ∼catequiv can be understood as asserting a component-wise
isomorphism. In the case of categories-up-to-isomorphism, this is immedi-
ate since an isomorphism of categories is defined as a functor that is an
isomorphism on both objects and arrows. In the case of categories-up-to-
equivalence the situation is more difficult. Here an equivalence of categories
is usually defined as a functor that is an isomorphism on arrows but only an
isomorphism-up-to-isomorphism (i.e. only essentially surjective) on objects.
But such a functor, I submit, can also be understood as an abbreviated way of
asking for a component-wise isomorphism if we take seriously the fact that we
only care about objects in a category-up-to-equivalence up to isomorphism.
In other words, the object part of a functor witnessing an equivalence between
categories should be understood as providing an isomorphism of objects-up-
to-isomorphism, rather than an isomorphism-up-to-isomorphism of objects.
And if we see it this way, then the informal criterion of identity ∼catequiv for
categories-up-to-equivalence is of exactly the same kind as the criterion of
identity ∼catiso for categories-up-to-isomorphism.
As a result, if we formalize Ocatiso as the type of precategories and Ocatequiv
as the type of univalent categories, then we can argue that ∼=Ocatiso and∼=Ocatequiv are canonically obtained from ∼catiso and ∼catequiv for the exact
same reasons. Indeed this point of view correlates very well with the formal-
ization of category theory in [48]: isomorphism of precategories (Definition
9.4.8) is easily seen to be equivalent to ∼=Ocatiso (Lemma 9.4.14, essentially)
and the definition can be repeated in the case of univalent categories. Now
it so happens that because of the extra saturation condition, ∼=Ocatequiv in the
case of univalent categories is also itself equivalent to a relation that more
closely resembles what usually goes under the name of “equivalence of cat-
egories” in mathematical practice (Lemma 9.4.14). But that is beside the
38Accepting the distinction between categories up to isomorphism and categories up to
equivalence depends on some level on accepting that groupoids are more fundamental than
categories. Although it is by no means a trivial or obvious thesis, I will say no more about
it here.
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point here. What matters, rather, is that both isomorphism of precategories
and “equivalence” of univalent categories can be obtained, up to equivalence,
as component-wise isomorphisms in exactly the same way.39
The above discussion illustrates very well the general method of formal-
izing criteria of identity as component-wise isomorphisms where, as ever, we
understand “isomorphism” as a placeholder for the notion of homotopy equiv-
alence. It is now time we stated this general method. For a given theoretical
context given by Oinf and ∼inf it goes as follows:
1. Decomposition: break down the structures of Oinf into all their relevant
components (S1, ..., Sn), some of which may depend on others.
2. Component-wise isomorphism: determine the relevant “local” criteria
of identity (∼1, ...,∼n) for objects in each of these components in such
a way that the “global” criterion of identity ∼inf can be understood as
a component-wise isomorphism.
3. Saturation: formalize Oinf in such a way that the formalized “local”
criteria of identity ∼i for each formalized component Si are homotopy
equivalent to the identity type.
4. Invariance: Argue that ∼=O is the correct formalization of ∼inf.
To illustrate how this general method works it is helpful to sketch how when
applied to the theoretical context of categories-up-to-equivalence it gives us
the formalized notion of univalent categories in HoTT:
1. Oinf is given by structures with the following components: Objects
(Ob), Arrows (A), Identities (I) and Composition (◦). These satisfy
the usual properties that define a category.
2. The criterion of identity ∼Ob for objects is isomorphism defined in the
usual way in terms of A, I and ◦. The criteria of identity for all
the rest of the components of the structure are standard. Categorical
equivalence can then be understood as a component-wise isomorphism
as sketched above.
3. We formalize Oinf as the type of univalent categories Ocatequiv, where
condition (7) provides the required saturation condition between the
formal version of ∼Ob and the identity type of Ob.
39An anonymous referee has correctly pointed out that the notion of a strict category
([48], Definition 9.6.1) which is a precategory where the type of objects is an h-set is
perhaps a better formalization of the informal notion of category-up-to-isomorphism. So
it is worth noting that everything I have said so far could be repeated for strict categories
instead of precategories, changing nothing of substance.
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4. As argued above, ∼=Ocatequiv is then the correct formalization of ∼inf.
Needless to say, the above-described general method is not a formal algo-
rithm. It is meant, rather, as a general rule of thumb about how to produce
invariant formalizations of theoretical contexts in UF. As a rule of thumb, it
will require specific tweaks in specific cases and of course will be subject to
varying interpretations. I will make no claim here that this method is precise
enough to pin down a unique formalization of every theoretical context. But
it is, I submit, precise enough to establish a general approach to invariant
formalizations – and no more than that is required as an argument in support
of (CI).
With this qualification in mind, we must now ask the much more difficult
question: does the method for determining criteria of identity as component-
wise isomorphisms extend to most structures of interest in mathematical
practice? Moreover, does it produce formalizations that mathematicians
would find native? To this, and more, the next section is devoted.
6 Formalizing all of mathematics in HoTT
To satisfy criterion (F), HoTT must at the very least prove capable of encod-
ing all of mathematics as it is currently being practiced, i.e. it needs to be a
“big-f” Foundation for all of mathematics rather than a “small-f” foundation
for a specific mathematical discipline. Therefore, I will begin my argument
for (F) by countering the three main objections that have been put forward
against UF’s capacity as a “big-f” Foundation. Then I will argue that the
general method outlined in Section 5 can be used to formalize most theoret-
ical contexts and that, in addition, the way in which this is achieved would
not appear alien to practicing mathematicians.
6.1 Is HoTT a “big-f” Foundation for all of mathemat-
ics?
As a formalization of the Univalent Foundations, HoTT is based on an ex-
tension of a well-understood formal system (intensional MLTT) that itself
has been plausibly discussed as offering a self-sufficient foundation for all of
mathematics. As such, the question of whether or not HoTT can be regarded
as a “big-f” Foundation for all of mathematics seems to me – if not unfair –
then at least to be one in which the burden of proof lies firmly on the side of
the skeptic. Therefore, I will not provide a positive account for an affirmative
answer to the title question, but content myself with countering what I take
to be the most widespread objections to such an affirmative answer.
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(A) “HoTT cannot be a foundation for all of mathematics because not all
of mathematics is homotopy theory!”
Response to (A): This objection (the most common one) betrays a ba-
sic misunderstanding about the distinction between the analytic and the
synthetic aspect of UF. UF certainly contains a synthetic theory of ∞-
groupoids40 and such a theory is certainly about (abstract) homotopy theory.
But UF also contains an “analytic” (for lack of a better term) version of set
theory, namely that given by h-sets (i.e. 0-types). Therefore, the short and
sweet response to (A) is simply this: UF is homotopy theory only insofar
as it constitutes a synthetic theory of ∞-groupoids. But UF is not merely
a synthetic theory of ∞-groupoids. And it is exactly all its other features
(including its “analytic” set theory) that make it a viable candidate to serve
as a (structuralist) Foundation of mathematics. To put the point differently:
UF is not merely a theory about homotopy types; it is a theory allowing you
to carry out constructions on homotopy types.41
Yet even though (A) fails as an objection, it does still highlight an im-
portant issue: the synthetic and the “analytic” side of UF (formalized as
HoTT) do not necessarily interact as one would expect. Let me illustrate
with an example. Suppose I am interested in proving that the topological
circle S1 is not homeomorphic to the topological sphere S2. I then define S1
and S2 synthetically as higher inductive types (call them “synthetic S1” and
“synthetic S2”) and then calculate their fundamental groups in the now well-
known way outlined in [48]. Have I thereby proved that topological S1 is not
homeomorphic to topological S2? Inside HoTT, I have not.42 Which leaves
the obvious worry: if in order to draw conclusions about spaces up to home-
omorphism you then have to repeat the relevant proofs (e.g. of pi1(S1) = Z)
at the level of h-sets, then how much is the synthetic side of UF adding to
UF-regarded-as-a-foundation?
I think this is an important limitation of HoTT but no deal-breaker with
respect to UF’s capacity to serve as a foundation for mathematics, for two
40For a precise and thorough explanation of the way in which HoTT/UF is a synthetic
theory of ∞-groupoids see Shulman [45].
41It is important to note that among such constructions are also those of homotopy types
that can be understood as models of set theory as traditionally conceived. For example,
the type SetU of h-sets without any further assumptions on HoTT is a model of a weak
predicative set theory (a “ΠW -pretopos”) and if we assume LEM then a model of ZFC
can also be constructed as a higher inductive type (cf. [48], 10.5).
42This is because it does not even make sense to consider synthetic S1 and S2 “up
to homeomorphism”. The very statement “S1 is not homeomorphic to S2” cannot be
stated in UF-regarded-as-a-synthetic-theory-of-∞-groupoids. It must be stated with S1
and S2 defined topologically, i.e. as h-sets with appropriate extra properties and structure
mirroring the way in which these spaces are usually defined in point-set topology.
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reasons. Firstly, the fact that synthetic calculations of homotopy groups in
HoTT cannot be used “as is” to formalize traditional inferences we might
draw about spaces up to homeomorphism does not mean that these syn-
thetic calculations are devoid of mathematical merit. Nor does it mean that
the above-described inferences (from the non-isomorphism of fundamental
groups to the non-homeomorphism of spaces) are not formalizable at all:
they can still very well be formalized at the level of h-sets (by repeating the
classical proofs). Secondly, it is worth remarking that there could be possible
extensions of HoTT that could ameliorate this situation. Most prominently,
there is a version of HoTT called cohesive HoTT (cf. [41,42,46]) that makes
the interaction between the synthetic and the “analytic” side more robust,
essentially by adding a kind of “topological” (or “cohesive”) structure to bare
homotopy types. This extra structure allows one to recover the “analytic”
versions of mathematical structures from their synthetic versions. In par-
ticular, one can prove (cf. [46]) that the realization of the synthetic S1 is
equivalent to the topological circle, thus solving the problem described above.
Perhaps this means that an argument could be made that cohesive HoTT
– even though motivated by questions in the foundations of higher gauge
theories in physics – could actually provide a worthy alternative “founda-
tional” formalization of UF. At the very least this demonstrates that the
lack of interaction between the analytic and the synthetic side in the current
formulation of HoTT is not an insurmountable obstruction.
(B) “UF cannot be a Foundation for mathematics because its basic objects
are not fundamental. ∞-groupoids were initially defined analytically
within set theory as sets with extra structure and properties. Therefore,
sets are more fundamental than ∞-groupoids.”
Response to (B): The objection here is that a synthetic theory of a
certain type of structure (e.g. ∞-groupoids in the case of UF) cannot be
a Foundation for the whole of mathematics if that type of structure can
be defined analytically in another formal system (e.g. ∞-groupoids as Kan
simplicial sets in ZFC). But this argument can just as easily be turned on its
head: by the same token one can argue that since UF provides an analytic
description of a set (as an h-set) then set theory cannot be a Foundation
since its basic objects can be defined analytically in another formal system
(as h-sets in UF).
The debate will then come down to which type of structure is more “in-
tuitively” fundamental: “shapes” or “collections”. But this no longer has
anything to do with (B). Furthermore, being able to define X in terms of Y
seems to me a highly unreliable guide to X or Y ’s relative fundamentality:
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we can define lines in terms of points (e.g. in Cartesian geometry) but we
can also define points in terms of lines (e.g. as the intersections of lines) and
these facts do not seem at all relevant in deciding whether points or lines
are more fundamental. As for historical reasons of priority (“sets are more
fundamental than ∞-groupoids because they were the first to be thought of
as the basic objects of mathematics”) I can only say that the correlation of
historical precedence and fundamentality is tenuous at best: would we sim-
ilarly want to say that point-shaped particles are surely more fundamental
than strings because point-shaped particles were the first, historically, to be
thought of as the fundamental constituents of matter?
Nevertheless, beyond relative fundamentality, one can also question the
inherent simplicity of homotopy types. In other words, are homotopy types
objectively simple enough to serve as the basic entities of a foundation of
mathematics? I believe the way to answer this is to ask the same question of
the criterion of identity which defines homotopy types, viz. homotopy equiv-
alence. For the simplicity of a certain concept is surely positively correlated
to the simplicity of its identity conditions. Now a homotopy equivalence
is simply a continuous (“smooth”, though not in the sense of calculus) de-
formation of one space into another. To formalize this idea takes a lot of
effort, especially in set theory, but this does not detract from its conceptual
simplicity. And since homotopy types are supposed to be exactly what gets
preserved by homotopy equivalence, they share in the simplicity of the no-
tion of continuous deformation. Quite simply, homotopy types are what you
cannot change about a space any way you continuously deform it.43 And
this way of describing what they are is good evidence that they possess some
inherent simplicity that makes them suitable to play the role of the basic
objects of a foundation of mathematics.
(C) “HoTT is merely a new kind of semantics for a pre-existing formal
system. It was not purpose-built as a formal system in order to capture
a pre-formal semantics in the same way that e.g. ZF(C) was purpose-
built to capture a pre-formal understanding of the cumulative hierarchy
of sets.”
Response to (C): It is true that HoTT builds upon a pre-existing for-
mal system (intensional MLTT) that originally had nothing to do with ho-
motopy theory. But the recycling and repurposing of formal systems is not
43Marquis makes a very similar point in arguing for the fundamentality of homotopy
types: “I submit that the notion of [homotopy equivalence] at work here is philosophically
fundamental: we are dealing with entities that can be continuously transformed into one
another.” ([30], p. 2151)
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only technically advantageous but also natural and unavoidable. Therefore,
on pragmatic grounds, the fact that the original “meaning explanation” of
Martin-Lo¨f in [31] has nothing to do with the homotopic semantics of HoTT
should not be seen as problematic. First-order predicate logic can also be
seen as a repurposing of Frege’s calculus in the Begriffsschrift, but surely
we wouldn’t want to claim that this presents conceptual worries for ZFC
simply because of their differing intended semantics. Furthermore, in the
specific case of intensional MLTT the higher structure of identity types was
for a long time considered a kind of aesthetic flaw of the system since no-
one could make sense of it semantically or find any use for it syntactically.
Indeed, until Hofmann and Streicher [18] constructed the groupoid model of
MLTT it was considered plausible that the UIP axiom (which would collapse
the higher structure of types and is incompatible with univalence) was prov-
able in MLTT. Through the homotopy interpretation, this higher structure
of identity types is once and for all revealed as a feature rather than a bug of
intensional MLTT. And this, to my mind, suffices to quell any worries that
intensional MLTT is being somehow misappropriated by UF.
6.2 Native formalizations for all theoretical contexts?
In Section 5 I argued for (CI) by describing a general method for formalizing
criteria of identity for mathematical structures as homotopy equivalences in
UF. By virtue of this general description, this method is uniform in the sense
of Section 3: wherever it applies, it applies for the same reason, i.e. for the
reason that it encodes criteria of identity as componentwise isomorphisms.
In addition to the objections considered above we must now ask whether
the method is wide enough: does it plausibly cover all structures of mathe-
matical interest? We must also ask whether it is native to mathematicians:
does it yield formalized notions comprehensible to mathematicians familiar
exclusively with their informal counterparts?
Let me begin with the first question, regarding the scope of the general
method. There are two approaches one could take here, one formal, one
informal. The formal approach would consist of providing a general notion
of a signature, plausibly wide enough to cover all structures of mathematical
interest, for which we would then prove a result analogous to the Structure
Identity Principle in [48]. I believe it is possible to define such a general notion
of a signature and have developed what I think is a plausible candidate in
[47]. Proving a Structure Identity Principle in terms of this general notion of
signature is certainly conceivable. However, I do not think that establishing
(SFOM) ought to rely on such a formal result. I understand (SFOM) here
as an informal thesis, gaining in generality what it perhaps loses in formal
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rigour. This is why I think it suffices for the purposes of this paper to rely
solely on an informal argument for (F).
This informal argument would need to establish that most theoretical
contexts in the practice of mathematics can be formalized using the general
method outlined in Section 5.2. To do so, first note that informal criteria
of identity will always strive to preserve all and only the structure of the
objects under consideration. Insofar as we are clear on what that structure
is, then there should be a clear and standard way to list the components
that are relevant to the objects under consideration. For example, if we are
interested in categories with specified limits, then we know that we should
be able to separate their objects up to equality and not merely up to iso-
morphism. Second, as long as we are able to list these components, then we
are able to formalize them inside UF, at least insofar as my responses to the
objections in Section 6.1 hold up. This will give us a formal definition of OUF
in HoTT. And then, finally, if we follow the method of Section 5 the correct
criterion of identity will be phrased in terms of isomorphisms between these
(formalized) components and will thus coincide with ∼=O. Therefore, insofar
as a mathematical structure of interest can be broken down in components
(each of which may come equipped with its own “local” criterion of identity)
then the class of such structures can be invariantly formalized according to
our general method.
However, this simple-sounding vision will face many difficult cases. Firstly,
with respect to the “small” theoretical contexts like the natural numbers that
are best formalized as individual types, we might find several examples in
UF that strain the principle of regarding identities in them as degenerate
versions of homotopy equivalence. An important such case is the synthetic
formalization of homotopy types, e.g. of the circle S1 as a higher inductive
type. It is admittedly unclear how my method can make sense of such a
formalization. In my defense, there is a blurry line between the role of higher
inductive types as formalizations of mathematical notions and their role as
actual mathematical structures themselves. This line is likely to remain
blurry until a general specification for higher inductive types is agreed upon.
Until such time comes it is difficult to say much about how problematic such
cases really will turn out to be for (SFOM).
Secondly, HoTT currently faces difficulties in formalizing notions from
higher category theory (paradigmatically, those developed by Lurie in [24]
and related work). In particular, somewhat ironically, HoTT is not very good
at formalizing itself. Due to issues related to being able to express infinite so-
called coherence conditions, the standard versions of HoTT (e.g. the one in
[48]) are not able to express what it would be for a type (e.g. a universe U) to
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be a model of HoTT.44 Similar problems arise for other such “∞-structures”.
There is therefore a likelihood that as more of these structures find their way
into the practice of mathematics, the less well HoTT will be able to live up
to (SFOM). I think this is a serious issue to consider, but it is not one that
an appropriately designed HoTT could not fix. Indeed, there exist solutions
that have already been proposed (e.g. Voevodsky’s HTS) but they remain
underdeveloped. But in any case, it must be conceded that until some general
consensus emerges as to what kind of HoTTs will prove equal to the task,
such theoretical contexts involving ∞-structures will present difficult cases.
Thirdly, with respect to the “large” theoretical contexts like category
theory, one may worry that my general method works only because of some
especially nice algebraic properties of (higher) categories and that it will
break down in “less algebraic” theoretical contexts. Take for example as our
theoretical context topological spaces up to homotopy understood in the tra-
ditional point-set-topological way – for ease of reference I will call the objects
traditional topological spaces and their criterion of identity traditional ho-
motopy equivalence. In the manner outlined by my general method, we may
now try to understand a traditional homotopy equivalence as a component-
wise notion if we agree that the correct criterion of identity for points in a
space X is for them to be connected by a continuous path. Namely, for a
given topological space X and two points x, x′ in X we define x ∼inf x′ as the
class of continuous paths between x and x′. But now we are in a situation
where the topology T of the space X will not in general respect ∼inf since it
is quite possible that there is an open set U ∈ T such that x ∈ U , x′ /∈ U but
x ∼inf x′. Clearly, in such a situation we will have to violate either step (1)
or step (3) of the general method. For we will either have to sacrifice talking
about open sets, thus ignoring one component of the notion in question, or
fail to assert that the (formalized) notion of continuous path can be equiva-
lent to identity. (If it were, then any two points connected by a path would
have to be contained in the same open sets, something which does not hold
informally.)45
What I want to say in response to such cases is summed up as follows:
if the intended criterion of identity for one component S1 of a structure is
not respected by some other component S2 (that may depend on S1) then
it is not a criterion of identity. To elaborate, it is helpful to consider a toy
case. So consider a theoretical context where structures in Oinf are given by
(at least) two components X and S and we impose some criterion of identity
44For a precise description to the problem, as well as an illuminating introduction to
possible methods that could solve it, cf. [44].
45The case of traditional topological spaces as a challenge to my general method was
raised by an anonymous referee, to whom I clearly owe this entire discussion.
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∼X on X. A formalization of this set-up in UF is given by the following data
(where we use the same notation for X and S as their informal counterparts):
X : U
S : X → U
∼ : X → X → U
In the example of traditional topological spaces, one can think of S as a
propositional family expressing whether a given term is in a certain open
set and x ∼ y as the type continuous paths between any two terms x, y : X
(where “continuous path” is defined in terms of some notion of topology in
terms of which S is also defined).
Now, on the one hand, it may be the case that we have two terms in one
component related by the criterion of identity in that component that are
explicitly separated by another component. In terms of the toy example, this
means that we have a, b : X such that there is f : a ∼ b but also S(a) and
¬S(b).46 I think it is clear that if one is considering a structure that contains
certain objects that are separated by one component S of that structure,
then no relation ∼ defined in terms of any other component that relates
objects that S separates can properly be called a criterion of identity. Any
criterion of identity deserving of the name must be one that respects any
other component of the structure under consideration. This indicates, for
example, that we should not formalize traditional topological spaces up to
traditional homotopy equivalence in HoTT as h-sets together with a family
of “open” subtypes satisfying the required conditions. For the fact that we
can define continuous paths in terms of open sets in mathematical practice
should not make us forever beholden to these open sets just as the fact that
pre-formally we define isomorphism in a category by separating objects up
to equality shouldn’t mean we are forever beholden to equality of objects.
On the other hand, there may not necessarily be any component “disre-
specting” a proposed criterion of identity for another component, but that
criterion of identity may be too “loose” to induce equivalences between the
rest of the components of the structure. For, ideally, we should want that
if a ∼ b then for any other component S that depends on a or b we have
S(a) ∼= S(b) (where ∼= is the preferred criterion of identity for entities of the
kind that S takes values in). For example, this is true in the case of categories
because an isomorphism between two objects also induces a bijection between
corresponding hom-sets.47 Yet we are perfectly well-able to imagine criteria
of identity that do not induce equivalences on the rest of the components
46Here ¬S(b) can be thought of as notation for S(b)→ 0.
47More precisely, for any other object c an isomorphism f : a ∼= b induces a bijec-
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of the structure but for which it is not contradictory to assert a saturation
axiom in the style of univalent categories. But this is not something that
should trouble us: for by asserting a saturation axiom we do ensure that all
other components of our structure end up respecting our chosen criterion of
identity in the way desired – and without any loss of information.48
The main difficulty shown up by the case of traditional topological spaces
is that it is often unclear in mathematical practice how to “remove” certain
pieces of structure in terms of which criteria of identity are expressed. For ex-
ample, in the case of categories-up-to-equivalence we might as well “remove”
the notion of equality of objects once we have decided that the criterion of
identity for objects is given by isomorphism. This is easily done in this case
since none of the already-given components (arrows, identities, composition)
separate objects more finely than isomorphism. By contrast, there is no easy
way to “remove” equality of points in a traditional topological space in favour
of continuous paths between them since open sets may very well separate two
such points. Nor is there any straightforward way to simply “remove” open
sets since the very notion of a continuous path is defined in terms of them.
On the other hand, it is far from clear that the intuitive notion of a con-
tinuous path between points must be expressed this way, i.e. in terms of
open sets that already separate distinct points. Indeed, the field of abstract
homotopy theory is largely devoted to setting up the theoretical context of
“topological spaces up to homotopy” in such a way that this does not occur,
i.e. by “algebraicizing” them in a useful way. But it is unclear whether this
process of “algebraicizing” can always take place – and even less clear that
it can always result in a theoretical context that practicing mathematicians
would find practically indistinguishable from the one we began with. Nev-
ertheless, it seems to me that such difficult cases usually arise because of an
inevitable bias towards thinking of the objects of mathematics in terms of
sets, which thus tends to force us into making very many distinctions that
might not prove necessary to faithfully formalizing the structures of interest.
The example of traditional topological spaces is a case in point: although
the point-set definition of a topological space makes perfect sense and can be
tion f∗ : Hom(c, a) ∼= Hom(c, b) by transporting morphisms along f and similarly for
Hom(−, c).
48What the above-described situation certainly does prevent us from doing is a Rezk-
completion-style construction. The reason that Rezk completion works in the case of
categories is exactly because we can use a given isomorphism to induce a bijection (i.e. h-
equivalence) between hom-sets. This means that isomorphisms “already” respect hom-sets.
But we have no reason to expect this to be the case in general. So the Rezk completion
construction certainly does not generalize to arbitrary structures, as of course one ought
to expect.
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studied as a mathematical object in its own right, it is by no account forced
upon us when we want to study spaces up to traditional homotopy.49
Even so, the second question remains: are the formalized notions we
end up with native ones? Will they be comprehensible to the practicing
mathematician (insofar as any formal system is)? In one sense, the idea of
formalizing anything as a structure on a homotopy type is likely to confuse
practicing mathematicians far more than the idea of formalizing such struc-
tures in terms of sets. But this is a premature criticism at least insofar as it
depends on the novelty of formalizing mathematical objects in terms of ho-
motopy types. It is certainly an idea that no-one had taken seriously pre-UF
and which at this point still may appear mysterious. In his recent talk [52]
Voevodsky emphasizes exactly this point:
The third component [of any foundational system] is a struc-
ture that enables humans to encode mathematical ideas in terms
of the objects directly associated with [the structures that pro-
vide the semantics for the sentences of this language in terms
of mental objects intuitively comprehensible to humans. In UF
this third component], a way to encode general mathematical
notions in terms of homotopy types, is based on the reversal of
Grothendieck’s ideas considered in [[20]].
Both mathematically and philosophically, this is the deepest and
least understood part of the story.
But from its novelty, it does not follow that it is an idea definitively incompat-
ible with mathematical practice (or, at the very least, with the mathematical
practice of today).
On the other hand, the idea that any structure and property can be
transferred along isomorphic objects is indeed very close to contemporary
49One is inevitably reminded of Grothendieck’s beautiful ruminations in his Esquisse
d’un Programme [15]:
[W]hen one tries to do topological geometry in the technical context of topo-
logical spaces, one is confronted at each step with spurious difficulties related
to wild phenomena. [...] This situation, like so often already in the history
of our science, simply reveals the almost insurmountable inertia of the mind,
burdened by a heavy weight of conditioning, which makes it difficult to take
a real look at a foundational question, thus at the context in which we live,
breathe, work – accepting it, rather, as immutable data. [...] It is this
again which explains why the rigid framework of general topology is pa-
tiently dragged along by generation after generation of topologists for whom
“wildness” is a fatal necessity, rooted in the nature of things. (pp. 258-259)
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mathematical thinking, as has been emphasized numerous times in the ex-
tensive literature on categorical foundations of mathematics. In that respect,
the formalized notions we end up with in UF are much closer to the way of
thinking of practicing mathematicians. The details of the formalization and
the formal system itself are certainly at the present moment in time not as
widespread as set-theoretic formalizations in terms of ZF(C). But the funda-
mental idea of caring about mathematical structures only up to isomorphism
– vastly generalized in HoTT – is certainly a defining trait of the mathe-
matical practice of today. And insofar as the general method outlined here
depends crucially on formalizing this exact trait, then the essence of the for-
malizations themselves should prove native to practicing mathematicians, at
least modulo the type-theoretic language barrier.
In conclusion, the general method I have offered cannot be taken as defini-
tive. But neither, of course, is it meant to be. The process of formalization,
after all, is not itself definitively formalizable. Insofar as formalizing math-
ematical structures and arguments still requires human intervention there
will always be difficult cases, requiring patches and choices not reducible
to general methods and principles. Ultimately, my argument for (F) – and
therefore also for (SFOM) – can only rely on an abundance of clear-cut cases
in which the general method does apply rather than on a purported clear-cut
argument that all cases are covered.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the extent to which UF satisfies (SFOM).
What I have argued for should not (and cannot) be taken to be a once-and-
for-all-argument that UF will always provide a way of formalizing mathemat-
ical structures of interest in an invariant manner. I would probably go so far
as to say that the general method I have described in Section 5 does provide
such a general method for formalizing most mathematical structures of cur-
rent interest. But mathematical practice is changing and we may soon begin
to study structures with properties that are just as difficult or unnatural to
formalize in UF as higher-categorical structures in ZFC. Therefore, insofar as
(SFOM) is tied to the mathematical practice of today (and of the immediate
future) no claim that I make in this paper can exceed it. Nevertheless, even
with this limitation in mind, there is certainly an important conclusion that
emerges from the current argument: with respect to (SFOM), UF presents
a quite significant improvement over (extensional or structural) set-theoretic
foundations of mathematics.
Does this now mean: off with set theory’s head? Not at all. In fact, I think
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UF and set theory, especially ZFC, are not best understood as competing
foundations. The relationship I envisage between ZFC and UF is essentially
that of successive (but co-existing) conceptual schemes in the Quinean sense.
Neurath’s famous (and somewhat overused) metaphor of the mariner is apt:
UF is slowly rebuilding the ship of the foundations of mathematics using the
material of set theory on which it still relies to stay afloat. For example,
ZFC is used to build the simplicial model of UF [21] and the construction of
homotopy types in ZFC still guides our intuitions about what ought to be
true of them. A pluralistic picture, I believe, is the most appropriate attitude
to take here – one in which set-theoretic foundations and UF establish a
symbiotic relationship. I intend to spell out this picture, and explain its
advantages, in future work.
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